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The Cave of Doxa 
Reflections on Artistic Research and on Cave Art
Mats Rosengren
Introduction
In order to situate this article, as well as the position from which I write, in the 
contemporary academic and epistemic field, a few words on my epistemological 
stance is needed.1 In calling my approach to the current epistemological 
situation doxological, I am not evoking a theological turn in the theory of 
science. Rather the opposite, actually. I want to emphasise and recognise the 
fact that all knowledge is created by humans, and thus is human knowledge and 
never epistemic (in the Platonic and, perhaps, theological sense). This is not a 
new insight, nor am I the first to focus this anthropic conditioning on all that 
we claim to know. But it has been downplayed in the history of Western thought, 
neglected as something both evident and unimportant in the scientific quest 
for ever more knowledge.
The term doxology has an established usage both in theology and in liturgy, 
denoting different forms of praise of God. My usage of the term, however, is 
pre-theological, in the sense that it reconnects with ancient philosophy and the 
debate between philosophers and sophists about the nature of knowledge. 
Siding with rhetoricians and sophists, I claim that all knowledge is doxic, that 
is, anchored in, and born not only by language and different symbolic forms, 
but also, and perhaps most importantly, by practices, bodies, rites, and rituals. 
In fact, what has been called epistemic knowledge is, and has always been, 
produced within and by some kind of doxa.  Be it a doxa that is scientific, social, 
historical, artistic, it consequently has no better claim to objectivity, timelessness 
or reality (in the traditional sense of these terms) than doxa. Hence doxology, 
instead of epistemology, is a more fitting name for teaching about human 
knowledge and knowing. 
 1. In Art Monitor #1 2007 I 
presented the outlines of my 
doxological stance. Hence 
I will give only a very brief 
introductory presentation of 
the doxology that I have been 
developing over the last few 
years, before approaching my 
topic proper.
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Doxology takes heed both of the postmodern critique of the traditional 
concepts of knowledge, subjectivity and intentionality (among others), and of 
our need for being able to distinguish true from false, real from unreal, and fact 
from fiction. In this sense, it is a post-postmodern stance, trying to rework the 
traditional concepts without resorting to, on the one hand, blindfolded 
empiricism or, on the other, free-floating relativism. Our knowing is always 
conditioned by what is always already at hand (practices, prejudices, 
documentation, and so on), but is by no means determined by these conditions. 
Doxology allows human creation to play a central part in scientific endeavour.
Protagoras was, perhaps, the first in Western thought to adopt a doxological 
position concerning the possibilities of knowing and knowledge. That is, he 
chose human imperfection, unsure belief and unavoidable change instead of 
Platonic immobility and certainty. His famous dictum about man as the 
measure of all things, the homo mensura-fragment, is perhaps the most poignant 
expression of this position. What we learn from Protagoras, and what has, 
thanks to the rhetoric tradition, been present ever since (though as an 
undercurrent), is that no apprehension escapes the anthropomorphic 
conditions of knowledge alluded to in the fragment. For instance, our knowledge 
is always embodied (as part of our biological being); formulated and/or 
preserved in some language, institution or ritual; practised and upheld by one 
or many individuals, always in one historical moment or other and within the 
admittedly diffuse framework of an ever changing but still specific social 
situation. All these factors co-determine our knowledge, making it a part of a 
fluctuating, always changing, and multi-layered doxa. Each claim to universal 
knowledge is, to use Chaïm Perelman’s formulation from his seminal work The 
New Rhetoric, an attempt to convince a universal audience (and moreover a 
universal audience more or less of one’s own choosing and constitution).2 
Consequently, doxa does not reveal reality as it is in itself, but as it appears to 
us, being the kinds of beings that we are, in the specific situations and bodies in 
which we find ourselves. I like to think of doxology, not as a teaching about 
apparent or illusory knowledge, but as a teaching about situated, variable and 
interested knowledge. That is, a teaching, prolonging, using and modifying the 
rhetorical tradition, about how we actually create the knowledge that we need 
to live in our human cave, from which there is no escape, no matter what Plato 
may have said. So it is no coincidence that I have chosen cave art as my prime 
example in an attempt to apply doxology to a contemporary field of research.3 
However, my main focus in this essay will not be cave art itself, nor doxology. 
I want to see what we may learn about the possibilities for, and the limits of, the 
emerging field of artistic research; through looking at some aspects of the 
development of a traditional Humanities discipline, where art has been a 
central and pivotal concept. Doxologically speaking, I am convinced we need to 
explore the areas where art and science have already been obviously intertwined 
conceptually and in practice. This is necessary in order to avoid reproducing 
sterile oppositions (as art or science, knowledge or creations, conceptual work 
or practices), when trying to develop concepts and procedures which will allow 
us to create the field of artistic research as a new kind of scientific-artistic field 
for production of knowing and knowledge. Artistic research cannot be a 
question of adapting science to art and art to science, as if the two were distinct 
and homogenous entities. Artistic research offers the possibility of a genuine 
creation (in the sense cherished by Cornelius Castoriadis), which is a creation 
of a new form, an academic-artistic field.
2.   For an introduction and 
discussion of Perelman’s 
concept of audience, see 
Rosengren (2004)
3.   In the yet unpublished 
manuscript Caveopenings 
I use the story of the 
discovery of cave art and the 
subsequent development 
of the discipline cave art 
studies to further develop my 
doxological stance.
53
But there is a tricky methodological problem at play here, how am I to avoid 
closing and structuring this new field in the making when speaking: firstly from 
a position within the Humanities; secondly using all the old words; and thirdly 
importing and reproducing within this new field, the same conceptual 
oppositions and notions that have haunted Western science in the form of a 
logocentric metaphysics of presence? (Using Derrida’s formulation as an 
abbreviation for a long and tortuous argument.)
This is a question calling for a strategy of writing, as well as a strategy of 
reading: I, as a writer, will use cave art research as a supplement (once again in 
a Derridian sense), which allows me to address problems and propose solutions 
that I find pertinent both for cave art studies, and indirectly, for the formation 
of the field of artistic research. You, as a reader (positioned in a specific field, be 
it art, science or whatever), will, if you like, be able to incorporate and trans-
form what I say, and use, abuse, translate it, or just simply apply it within your 
own field or when working with or relating to issues of artistic research. 
A strategy of writing, reading and perceiving is needed to avoid a premature 
structuring of a field that is still all-too-vulnerable to usurpers of all kinds, not 
least the benevolent ones. In Deleuzian terms: The only way not to impose the 
same arboric thinking on the field of artistic research, as is dominant everywhere 
else in science, is to respect that the growth must be allowed time to establish 
itself as a sufficiently complex rhizome before we can start grafting on to it, 
without running the risk of immediately transforming it into a tree.
Nevertheless, the law of genre in the Human Sciences, demands that I state 
my position clearly, and that I will do, but only occasionally, mostly from the 
side and always passing through cave art studies. Though when it comes to 
doxological matters, I will speak plainly, hoping to give some reasons for 
shaping artistic research in consonance with doxological thinking. To put it 
bluntly, I hope that by confronting some of the issues that have arisen within 
the field of cave art studies during the last century with a doxological perspective, 
I will somewhat help to further the formation of a new form for knowing and 
knowledge.
When reproductions of the paintings in Altamira, the first of the painted 
caves in Europe to be discovered, were first published in 1890, they were 
immediately seen as aesthetic objects, and mainly due to these aesthetic 
qualities, rejected as fakes by the scientific community. It was not until 1901, 
after the discovery of several painted caves undoubtedly from the Paleolithic 
Period (between ten and forty thousand years before the present), that mural 
cave art was scientifically accepted. Consequently, the years following this 
scientific consecration were filled by discoveries, and rediscoveries, of painted 
caves.  Most famous are the cave of Niaux and the cave of Bedehilac, both in the 
Pyrenees.
Elsewhere, I have discussed the intriguing conceptual problems involved in 
this discovery and rediscovery. Here I will limit myself to two aspects of the 
discipline of cave art studies: the use of the term art, and the history (and 
presumed validity) of image interpretations found in the caves.4
Cave ‘Art’?
In calling what we find in the Paleolithic caves ’art’, we say far more than most 
of us would want to or, for that matter, are entitled to. In fact, to call the 
markings found on the walls of the caves ’art’ is to not make a neutral description 
of what kind of things they are. It is, one may argue, to inscribe them into a 4.  See Rosengren (2007a)
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large, but nevertheless specific (Western) aesthetic context that was formed in 
the Eighteenth Century. This will, in many often barely discernable ways, limit, 
and to a certain extent, guide our perception and understanding of these 
markings. Using the term ’art’ in connection to what we find on the cave walls 
is, if one accepts this point of view, like already deciding from the start what 
kind of objects we are dealing with, and hence what attitude to adopt towards 
them.
From a doxological point of view, the usage of a term or concept is never 
’innocent’ or neutral.5 Taking its cue from ideas that were central for the early 
Jacques Derrida, doxology does not naïvely think that replacing an old, 
entrenched concept or term with a new one (through a new definition, or by 
adopting a an old word to a new usage, or by paraphrasing etc.) will leave us in 
control of the new term, the new sense we are aspiring to. Every new term, new 
definition, or paraphrase, has to insert itself into the already-existing and ever-
changing grid of terms, concepts, and practices that condition meaning and 
possible usage to a much larger extent beyond general acknowledgement. But, 
and I would like to emphasise this to avoid the accusations of reductionism or 
determinism that tend to spring forth as soon as one talks about the conditions 
for our human sense-making, this conditioning is not to be understood as 
determination. It does in fact leave room for what Castoriadis calls radical 
imagination, or what Derrida calls différance (with the famous ’a’), and hence 
for creation of new concepts. What it does not leave room for, is an explanation 
of the meaning of a term or concept only in terms of the intentions of the users, 
or only in terms of definitions (be they of the stipulative, the usage, the 
ostentative, or any other kind), or only in terms of social usage. This would be 
considered an unfounded reduction from a doxological viewpoint.
But what is it precisely that we do when we call the drawings, etchings, the 
macaronis, the carvings, and the figures we find in the caves art? Are we apply-
ing a concept and a term that represents some kind of ’closest match’ to what 
we are already familiar with? Are we recording similarities that are already out 
there in the world for us to pick up, or are we creating an object that was not 
there before? Or all of these at once?6
Since the usage of the term ’art’ became an issue in the field of cave art stu-
dies (1980’s), there seem to be at least two different, and opposite, views on this 
matter.7 As the interest in this debate hinges on details in the different ways of 
approaching the topic, and in order to give each position a fair presentation, I 
will render them through quite lengthy quotes. This will also make it possible 
for me to pinpoint the places where a doxological view would differ from 
both.
The first position is that of Margret Conkey and Olga Soffer. In the 
introduction to their book with the telling title Beyond art: Pleistocene Image 
and Symbol (1997), they spell out their argument concerning the use of the 
term and concept of ’art’ in connection to what was found, and what we still 
find in the caves:
Although most of us would agree that many of these images are 
indeed aesthetically pleasing, to call them “art” is both misleading 
and limiting. There are two assumptions behind the term “art” that 
are particularly troublesome. First, as defined in the past century, 
art is a cultural phenomenon that is assumed to function in what 
we recognize and even carve off separately as the aesthetic sphere. 
5.   I have written about this 
before, see especially chapter 
3 and 4 of Rosengren (2006), 
but also, in English, Rosengren 
2004 for a somewhat 
less detailed discussion 
concerning the usage of the 
term “epistemology”. 
6.  Term and concept are of 
course not identical – but it is 
not possible to make the dis-
tinction between a term and 
the concept it is supposed to 
be representing in a general 
way – one cannot disconnect 
the concept from its represen-
tations. The distinction term/
concept may and must in 
many cases be drawn – but it 
can never be an absolute dis-
tinction; it has each time to be 
situated and motivated within 
a specific epistemic and/or 
linguistic situation, in relation 
to (linguistic) practices and to 
the dominant (linguistic) doxa. 
And if this is nominalism, so 
be it.
7.    As we will see below, the term 
“art” was adopted without any 
hesitation from the very first 
moments of cave art studies 
– it was only with the impact 
of post-structuralist and post-
modern modes of thought that 
this usage became an object 
of concern.
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There are longstanding debates, even within the Western intellectual 
and cultural traditions about the definition(s) of “art”. This aesthetic 
function is something that we cannot assume to have been the case 
in prehistory. […] The equally troubling second assumption behind 
the term “art” as applied to these very early visual cultures is this 
idea that it is somehow transcendent and therefore provides us with 
transcendent values. To claim Lascaux, for example, as the “first 
masterpiece” of human art history reveals more about our cultural 
categories and constructions than about the contexts of prehistoric 
social action within which the production of such imagery as 
Lascaux took place and had meaning.8
I do of course agree that we should avoid a naive projection of our own 
contemporary categories onto the objects we think of as belonging to history or 
prehistory. To claim, like Georges Bataille and many others, that art in our sense 
was ’born’ in the Lascaux or any other cave, just seems to be plain wrong. 
Doxologically speaking, there are no transcendental values hidden in the signs 
and symbols in the caves, nor are they vehicles transporting sense through the 
ages. They are ever standing possibilities for us to interpret and try to make 
sense of. This is a conceptual work that has nothing to do with the recuperating 
of hidden meanings, but everything to do with our semiotic, discursive, 
hermeneutic, scientific practices and abilities.
So what are our alternatives? We have to remember Derrida’s warning that 
the step outside metaphysics, out of our Western tradition, with all its terms 
and concepts, is by no means easy to effectuate, if at all possible. But, as he also 
says: not all ways of giving in to this state of affairs are equally valid. It is a 
question of the critical responsibility of one’s own discourse, a problem related 
to an economy of language and of discursive strategy.9 And one possible strategy 
here would be to keep using the term ’art’, always keeping in mind the historical 
overload of sense it carries, and try to counteract the senses that seems most 
threatening in different strategic ways. We are in a position where we have to be 
’bricoleurs’, where we cannot ever aspire to become ’engineers’, no matter how 
hard we try.10 Or, as Castoriadis perhaps would have said: We are always already 
downstream, and that is where we have to start.
Keeping this in mind is essential, not only for cave art studies, but also for 
the domain of artistic research in the making. Bricolage, as both a practical and 
conceptual strategy, seems to be one way of disarming the age-old oppositions 
that still seem to govern our thinking and doing. But exactly how such a 
bricolage should be performed cannot (for reasons already stated above) be 
spelt out as a recipe. It has to be reinvented, recreated in each specific situation 
within the field itself, and according to the specific demands of artistic, scientific, 
institutional, political, and aesthetic circumstances. 
The second position concerning the usage of the term ’art’ within cave art 
studies is articulated in the work of Michel Lorblanchet. In oppositions to, 
among others, Margaret Conkey (the allusions in the following quote are to an 
earlier article of hers), he claims that we are well advised to be wary when 
employing the term ’art’ to avoid inscribing what we find in the caves in a too 
narrow, aesthetic paradigm: 
[t]he term “art” is in no way reducing. It does not imply a 
“monolithic interpretation”, nor a semantic classification in “one 
8.   Soffer and Conkey (1997: 
2-3)
9.   Derrida (1967: 412-414)
10. For Derrida’s now classical  
discussion of Lévis-Strauss’s 
terms “bricoleur” and 
“ingénieur”, see Derrida 
 (1967: 418)
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and the same category” since it does not, in fact, imply any 
particular interpretation at all. It is just the expression of the 
freedom and sensibility of men facing the productions of the past, 
but freedom does not imply ignorance: In recognizing the 
historicity of the significations and the usages of the rock images 
[des images rupestres], we know that we are contemplating 
prehistoric works with a different regard than that of our faraway 
predecessors.”11
Lorblanchet is trying to distance himself from what he thinks of as an all-too-
narrow aesthetic understanding of the term ’art’. Instead he invokes the broader 
sense of art as ’artefact’ in general, and claims that even though Conkey et al are 
right in warning us against the possible consequences of the usage of ’art’ when 
designating what we find in the caves, these consequences are by no means 
inevitable.
Lorblanchet is quite right when he points out that ’art’ does not imply a 
monolithic interpretation or a classification in one and the same category. At 
the same time I think he underestimates the danger that Conkey points out. In 
reducing this danger to just an “expression of the freedom and sensibility of 
men facing the productions of the past”, he seems to ignore that the very act of 
calling the findings in the caves ’art’ in fact inscribes them into the aesthetic 
sphere of the early Twentieth Century. The archaeological discoveries in the 
caves in the beginning of the last century were treated as surveys of art history, 
and integrated into a realm where notions of beauty, disinterest and of an 
eternal yearning for the aesthetically pleasing were central. And this aesthetical 
inscription is still being upheld, both within the field of cave art studies and in 
the general doxa concerning art and cave art. A telling trace of this general doxa 
is found printed on a postcard depicting a bull from Lascuax that was recently 
sent to me by a French colleague and friend, Pierre Dumesnil, in September 
2007. It says, first in French, followed by an English translation: 
“Nothing better has been painted since”, declared Picasso of the 
paintings in the cave at Lascaux, which date back to the Aurignacian 
period (Upper Paleolithic, 15 000 BC). By the light of oil lamps, no 
brighter than candlelight, men depicted the animal world around 
them, perhaps as a part of an initiation rite. The careful way that 
pigments were projected onto the rock, and the usage of its surface 
to render the animals’ rough coats, suggest that these hunters 
mastered artistic technique. Often referred to as the prehistoric 
Sistine Chapel, these cave paintings are the beginning of art, such is 
the emotion they inspire.12
These words, signed by a certain Pierre Maisoncelles, of whom I know nothing, 
condenses, as I will be showing below, many themes and opinions that are still 
current in the field.
In his emphasis on the freedom and sensibility of the first archaeologist’s 
choosing to use the term ’art’ to designate paintings in the caves, I think 
Lorblanchet, in his 1991 text (just quoted), is underestimating the aesthetic 
pull of the term, and that he is putting too much faith in the transparency of 
intentions behind this choice.
11. Lorblanchet (1991) The 
quotes are, according to the 
information in Lorblanchet’s 
text taken from Margret 
Conkey, “New approaches in 
search for meaning? A review 
of research in Paleolithic Art”. 
Journal of Field Archaeology 
14: 413–430, p 414.
12. Grotte de Lascaux, La grande 
salle des tauraux, carte postal 
(2004) Editions la noisette/
le baobab
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Returning to the topic eight years later, in the book La Naissance de l’art from 
1999, Lorblanchet basically maintains the same position. He seems to have 
listened to what his critics had to say, but only to state his own case even more 
forcefully. After contending that however we may define ’art’, it will ’generally’ 
contain a notion of ’beauty’ and ’pleasure’ that is dominating in “contemporary 
art that has lost its religious content”, he accepts that “one ought to be careful 
with modern aesthetical discourse”.13 The goal of cave art studies, he concludes, 
should be “to recreate the perception and usage of the images of the peoples in 
the past.” In the following paragraph he writes:
Despite the utility of the invitations to be careful when using the 
word “art” about the productions of faraway periods, let us be frank 
and say clearly that the debate brought up by the Anglo-Saxon 
school [i.e. Conkey et alt] is a false debate.
The notion of “art” certainly has a history. Its definition has often 
varied during the past. Nevertheless, in spite of these variations, art 
has for a long time had an utilitarian function, most often a religious 
one, but at the same time it has always had an aesthetic content. It 
would be reducing and entirely false to deprive the man of origin of 
an aesthetic sense. It is even probable that art is born from the 
pleasure of perceiving forms and colours, and that it was for 
hundreds of millennia essentially an aesthetic play before becoming 
a religious activity for some tens of millennia only to, recently, 
perform a sort of return to the sources.14
Lorblanchet goes on to discuss the relationship that, according to him, was 
never an opposition between the aesthetic and the utilitarian functions (beauty 
and efficiency are always mutually supportive). The beauty of Paleolithic art is 
first and foremost functional, Lorblanchet concludes, before providing us with 
the definition of art that he intends to use in his book:
[...] the original works of art are defined as “the mind’s marks on 
nature”, as works that seem to go beyond the needs of immediate 
survival to express, on the contrary, an aesthetic kind of care, 
theoretically linked to playful or symbolic behaviour, without it 
being possible to always separate or even demonstrate them. 
Therefore we will consider as manifestations of art in its beginning 
man’s appropriation of nature’s strange productions and the human 
creations that, no matter their aim or content (that we generally 
ignore), imply a play of materials, colours and forms (that we 
perceive). We will of course be wary of projecting the aesthetic tastes 
of our time onto the productions of our very far away ancestors.15  
I find Lorblanchet to be more convincing in his 1999 discussion than he was 
before, especially when it comes to his attempt at providing a workable 
definition of art for the purposes of his book. But I do not agree that the debate 
raised by Conkey and others is a false debate, far from it. And when Lorblanchet 
talks about the aesthetic sense of our forebears as something given, I am even 
more reluctant to follow. He does not seem to notice that his very usage of 
aesthetic (aesthetic content, aesthetic sense) does exactly what Conkey warned 
13. Lorblanchet (1999:8)
14. Lorblanchet (1999:8)
15. Lorblanchet (1999:8)
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against, it projects a specific way of conceiving, a specific concept, onto an 
object out of the Pre-Eighteenth Century past. But then again, as I noted above, 
how are we to avoid this kind of projection? We have the terms and concepts we 
have which tend to wring itself out of our grip and escape our intentions. 
It is, as stated above, a problem of critical awareness, economy and strategy, 
rather than a problem of definitions or ’real’ meaning. And I find that 
Lorblanchet’s attempt at a working definition is a good strategy to counteract 
the pure aesthetic sense of art. In stubbornly emphasising the sense of ’art’ for 
all kinds of artefacts and as “works that seem to go beyond the needs of 
immediate survival”, Lorblanchet (no doubt unknowingly) opens a possible 
route of investigation that may prove interesting for artistic research: To see 
science as an art and art as a production of artefacts (among which we find, 
knowledge) both showing, as Lorblanchet would have it, “an aesthetic kind of 
care, theoretically linked to playful or symbolic behaviour, without it being 
possible to always separate or even demonstrate them.”16 What is lacking here is 
an explicit reflection on the way such a usage would change the sense of both 
art and science, but attempting to frame such a development would no doubt 
be premature in this setting. It is the task of every artistic researcher to reflect 
upon, and to eflect this change in his or her work. 
The validity of interpretations
In posing the question of how to evaluate interpretations in this context, I am 
evoking a problem that should, mutatis mutandis, be central to artistic research. 
Let me be explicit about my intentions here. Through a brief presentation of 
the history of Paleolithic cave art interpretations, I would like to highlight some 
features, intrinsic to every scientific discipline, that co-determine the production 
of knowledge within the discipline in question. The constitution of a specific 
epistemic field, the field affects (among which we, of course, find the tendency 
to write works and histories about the field), the topics. Since there are, as 
Bourdieu repeatedly says, invariants in the fields, we may hope to learn 
something about how the field of artistic research is being formed by looking at 
how the field of cave art studies, (where both science and art has been and are 
at stake) was formed. In the last part of the article, I will directly address some 
epistemic issues raised within the study of cave art that are doubtlessly directly 
relevant to the domain of artistic research. I have already said that I do not 
intend to prescribe anything positive or conclusive in relation to artistic 
research, nor would I presume that I could. No, the point of this exercise is to 
make possible a good use of what is already at hand in one of the fields of the 
human sciences. Artistic research has to constitute itself and its field in forming 
its own criteria, but not out of nothing, nor into nothing. It will, as an academic 
field, inevitably be (and already is) conditioned by its scientific and artistic past, 
but it is not thus determined. And in this gap between conditioning and causing, 
a radical formation may take place, but only if one minds the gap. 
After the consecration of Paleolithic mural cave art in 1902, the academic 
history of cave art studies is a story of multiple efforts of making sense of the 
material at hand:17 ranging from the most simple (the making of cave art was 
just a pastime in between other activities); to the most elaborate (cave art as a 
complicated multi-layered ‘language’). This history is intimately connected to 
changes, struggles and epistemological conflicts in the human and social 
sciences in the last century. Consequently, as the field of cave art studies 
16. I am consciously transforming 
the sense of Lorblanchets 
text here – please compare 
with the unaltered quote just 
above, before ascribing this 
view to Lorblanchet himself.
17. Laming-Emperaire,1962, p. 72
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consolidated itself on (rather than within the boundaries of archaeology, 
anthropology and ethnography), soon, what Pierre Bourdieu calls field effects, 
began to appear. (Works that talk about the field, contribute to writing its 
history and thus play a part in forming its identity.18) Marc Groenen writes 
about the constitution and birth of the discipline:
But this long course of events, leading from André Brouillet who 
unearths the engraved Chauffaud-bone just after 1834 and the 
young Maria de Sautuola who noticed the bison of Altamira in 
1879 to Emile Cartilhac and his Mea culpa d’un sceptique in 1902, 
represents the gestation and the birth of a new discipline about 
which one may say, even at this moment, that it still remains to be 
constructed in its entirety. Everything must be marked, collected, 
published and interpreted.19
The pioneering works of Henri Breuil, his theories, and especially the 
reproductions from the caves he visited and investigated, came to constitute the 
core of the discipline for the first decades of the Twentieth Century, and, in 
many ways, all up to the 1960s. In 1962, Annette Laming-Emperaire published 
her thesis La Signification de l’Art Rupestre Paléolotique, in which she gives an 
authoritative presentation of “the hypothesis and theories regarding the 
signification of palelolithic cave art” up until her own contribution.20 In doing 
this, she sets the form for, and to a large extent, defines the content of the history 
of the discipline. (If one is to judge from contemporary publications engaging 
in similar overviews: for example David Lewis -Williams’ The Mind in the Cave 
(2002).) Thus, the new discipline was born in France, and remained an almost 
exclusively French affair until at least the end of the Second World War. In 2003, 
Emanuel Anati, who, while adding a few extra details, reproduces the same 
structure regarding the history of interpretations, writes that: 
[…] the first studies of the signification of prehistoric art were made 
by French researchers. Recently, this interest has extended to other 
countries and continents, but the French research has kept its 
supremacy. Not long ago, due to the then prevailing idea according 
to which prehistory was a regional discipline, the academic 
establishment regarded with perplexity the comparisons between 
the Paleolithic art of Western Europe and the art of archaic hunters 
of non-European regions. The main hypothesises about the 
motivations for the most ancient artistic production deals essentially 
with European Paleolithic art, but other theories have been 
formulated since then.21 
Since my intention is neither to write the history of the discipline of cave art 
studies, nor to present an exhaustive discussion of all theoretical attempts 
within the field, I will not venture an in-depth discussion of some of the 
dominant scholars in the field: Henri Breuil; Max Raphael; Anette Laming-
Emperaire; or André Leroi-Gourhan and their respective contributions. Instead, 
I will content myself with a critical discussion of some aspects of their theories, 
allowing myself to highlight features that may shed some light on questions 
relating to the field of artistic research.
So, let me briefly retrace the structure established by Laming-Emperaire, 
18. For field effects, see Bourdieu, 
many places, for example 
“Quelques propriétés des 
champs” in Questions de So-
ciologie, Minuit, Paris, 1980, 
pp. 113-120.
19. Groenen, in Leroi-Gourhan, 
1992, p. 7
20. Annette Laming-Emperaire 
(1962), p. 63
21. Anati, 2003: p. 45-46. For 
Anati’s version of the history 
of interpretations, see 2003, 
pp. 44-56. The only additions 
to the structure established 
by Laming- Emperaire (see 
below) are what Anati calls 
”La théorie des calendriers” (p. 
51), ”La théorie du Chaman-
isme” (p.51-52), La théorie de 
la déesse mère” (p. 53) and 
”La théorie ’instinctive’” (p. 
54-55).
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and comment upon some of the different suggestions that have been made 
about the possible significance of cave art. 
Art for art’s sake
As soon as doubts about the authenticity of the Paleolithic mural cave art 
dissipated, the question of its significance became unavoidable. Not surprisingly, 
the first attempt to make sense of the strange act of painting in the deep places 
of the earth did not focus upon the paintings themselves.22 No, the motives and 
the form of the paintings were evidently seen as stemming from the everyday 
experience of the prehistoric man, and hence, unproblematic.  The fact that he 
(There never was any real question about the gender of the painters, nor has 
there been up until the 1980s.) painted was explained in two steps. Firstly, game 
was plentiful during the period when the paintings were made, leaving much 
spare time to be filled with some activity or another. Secondly, an assumption 
was made about man’s innate desire to create art. The combination of these two 
assumptions made the answer almost obvious, since man has this desire to 
create ’art’ (in this context, ‘beautiful things’), and since the Paleolithic Man 
had an abundance of time to do so, he simply created ’art for arts sake’, just for 
the fun and pleasure of it.23
This explanation leaves, to say the least, some questions unanswered. Why 
would man, even if he had the time, be at pains to venture deep into caves, 
(taling with him all the material needed for lightning, painting, and getting 
around to paint), and often in hard-to-reach places? And is it really true that 
man has this eternal aesthetical desire for making disinterested art? Here a 
small digression into a domain of some relevance to artistic research is 
unavoidable.
The uncanny ‘modernity’ of cave art
Popular notions die hard. Consequently, one finds an abundance of references 
to man’s aesthetic needs or desires in recent attempts at understanding cave art. 
For example, in 2006 Gregory Curtis wrote:
[…] the cave painters may not have had the idea of art as we 
understand it, but when they chose to draw an appealing line 
instead of an awkward one, they were thinking and acting like 
artists trying to create art in our sense of the word. […] The 
multicoloured and stylized Chinese Horses in Lascaux, the pride of 
the hunting lions with their eyes ablaze in Chauvet, and the weighty, 
yet delicately curving bison in Altamira and Font-de-Gaume all 
prove that beauty truly is eternal.24
I do not quote Curtis in this connection to make fun of him or of his work. I 
find his book both well thought out, and well written, one of the best that I have 
encountered in the semi-popular genre, where you tend to find most books on 
cave art, which are not written by specialists for a specialist audience) but focus 
on something (apart from the untenable notion of art and beauty as eternal in 
some way that I find both very problematic and probably unavoidable when 
one deals with mural cave art). Curtis formulates my query in this way: “How 
is it that they (the cave paintings) could be locked away in caves, unknown or 
misunderstood for eons, and yet, once discovered, fit naturally in the Western 
cultural tradition?”25
22. For this summary I rely mainly 
upon Clottes and Lewis-Wil-
liams (2001), Curtis (2006), 
Lamning-Emperaire (1962), 
Groenen, in Leroi-Gourhan 
(1992) and Lewis-Williams 
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23. Laming-Emperaire (1962), 
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I do not believe that the natural fit Curtis talks about, is natural at all. Seeing 
cave paintings (like seeing any other object) is a question of organising what 
you see in a form that makes sense for you. And in the case of complex objects, 
like cave art, this organising presupposes the acquisition of a concept, or more 
likely a set of concepts, and such acquisitions are definitely a social matter. So 
the fact that we now readily see the paintings in the caves as paintings of fauna 
from prehistoric times does not really tell us anything about what the painters 
say “to us so directly across the millennia,”26 but it definitely does raise the fol-
lowing question: why are these paintings are so accessible to us, so similar in 
style to many in the Western pictorial tradition, despite their antiquity and 
there being no connection (as far as we know) between the last cave paintings 
(8500 BCE) and the earliest beginnings (10,000 BCE) of the Western aesthetic 
tradition?
From a doxological point of view, the answer will not be found in the 
postulation of an eternal sense of beauty, nor in a natural aesthetic instinct in 
man, neither in some presupposed universal ’realism’ in art, to explain the 
similarity. Following a strand in Castoriadis’s thought, I would say that the 
forms created by prehistoric man have the somewhat eerie, quality (I have to 
admit) of being easy to re-cognise, and hence make sense today, up to a certain 
point. We who partake in the Western pictorial tradition of the early Twenty-
first Century (given the concepts of depiction and art that we have) readily see 
the traces in the caves as pictures of different animals we are more or less 
familiar with. But we do not as readily see the ’why’ and the ’wherefore’ of these 
images.
Of course, the core of the question still remains: why are these traces so 
easily integrated into our conceptual schemes? Part of the answer no doubt lies 
in what we share with the cave painters: our belonging to the human race, and 
our being Homo sapiens sapiens. But this seems to be only a minimal, though 
necessary, precondition, not explaining very much. 
Max Raphael, to whom I will come back soon, develops this idea a bit 
further, suggesting an analogy between the position of mankind during the 
Second World War and the Paleolithic cave painters. He writes:  
[If] the cave paintings strike us as being modern in conception, and 
therefore familiar, the reason is that they were produced in a unique 
historical situation and are a great spiritual symbol: for they date 
from a period when man had just emerged from a purely zoological 
existence, when instead of being dominated by animals, he began to 
dominate them. […] The Paleolithic paintings remind us that our 
present subjection to forces other than nature is purely transitory; 
these works are a symbol of our future freedom.27
It is obvious that Raphael’s answer is profoundly impregnated by the concerns 
and problems of his own time, and we may find it a bit naïve, not really 
addressing the question it tries to answer. But the most recent attempt at an 
answer that I know of, that of Gregory Curtis, is hardly more convincing. He 
writes:
The paintings speak to us directly across the millennia because they 
are the conservative art of a stable society, because they have a 
comic rather than tragic view of life, and because they are part of a 
classical tradition.28
26. Curtis (2006: 229)
27.  Raphael (1945: 1-2)
28. Curtis (2006: 229)
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Curtis devotes the last chapter of his book to argue for the validity of his thesis, 
highlighting important aspects of the cave art (most notably that its repetitions 
suggests a constancy in social practices that must have been satisfying for the 
Paleolithic man), but his arguments still seem, at least to me, to be 
gratuitous, especially when it comes to seeing “the cave paintings as scenes of 
comedy, not tragedy”.29 Both Raphael and Curtis teach us three things: to be 
wary not to project onto the walls of the caves what seems to be evident to us at 
a certain conjecture in time and historical space; to keep our desires for a 
universal taste for beauty in check; and to be careful in choosing our concepts 
and topoi (they may bring on more than we bargain for). Keeping the last point 
in mind is of crucial importance when talking about words, objects, and 
phenomena within a fairly new field such as artistic research. 
How are we then to understand the accessibility of Paleoltihic art? I am 
afraid that I have no ready answer at this stage. Following a doxological line of 
thought, the answer would have to be sought through addressing the conditions 
theough which anything at all in the caves is perceived. More specifically, we 
neede to adedress our tendency to configure the traces in the caves as primarily 
aesthetic objects, as ’art’ in the narrow sense evoked by Conkey. I have presented 
the somewhat heated debate concerning the use of the term ’art’ in this 
connection, and also suggested some strategic ways of dealing with it. For the 
moment, I can add nothing more. 
Hunting magic and totemism
When the ’art for art sake’ explanation was found wanting, the next step 
was (remember that we are at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, when Sir 
James George Frazer (and his The Golden Bough) still was one of the more 
influential scholars in the domain) to see if an explanation based on sympathetic 
magic would fare better. According to Laming-Emperaire, the article written in 
1903 by the pre-historian Salmon Reinach, L’art et la magie, opened the way for 
a more profound explanation of the pictures in the caves.30 Most importantly, 
Laming-Emperaire writes that Reinach initiated “a new mental attitude that 
was to become that of the researchers of the Twentieth Century”. Henceforth 
prehistoric art was considered to be the material trace of a number of beliefs 
and rites whose equivalents it is possible to find among the primitives of today. 
All attempts of interpreting prehistoric art were founded in comparative 
ethnography.”31 Thus, the ’argument by analogy’ (that we can understand the 
way of living as well as how people thought during Paleolithic times by 
comparing with ’primitive’ cultures supposedly living in more or less the same 
way as we think our forebears did) was established in cave art studies. This 
argument has been much criticised, and for good reasons, but like the ‘art for 
art sake’ explanation, it lingers, and from time to time, still pops up in 
contemporary attempts to make sense of the traces in the caves. I will return to 
this argument shortly, in connection with the most recent attempts of 
interpretations.
The new attitude that Laming-Emperaire talks about, was embraced and 
further developed, most prominently by Henri Breuil, into a theory of mural 
cave art completely explained by hunting magic: Why paint horses, unless it 
was seen as a way of increasing their numbers? Why paint bisons, if it is not 
seen as a way to ensure good hunting? 
Breuil and his thoughts were to dominate debates on prehistory and 
29. Curtis (2006: 232)
30. See Laming-Emperaire 
(1962: 72-75) for references.
31. Laming-Emperaire (1962:75)
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especially cave art studies in France until after the Second World War. Summing 
up the alleged advantages of the hunting-magic hypothesis, Lewis-Williams 
writes:
At first the explanation seemed to explain why so many of the 
images were hidden in the dark chambers: magic would be 
performed out of sight. Then, too, the explanation seemed 
appropriate to the species depicted in the caves. When images of 
felines an other dangerous animals were found, ones that it seemed 
unlikely people would consciously hunt or want to increase, Breuil 
explained their presence by saying that the artist hoped to acquire 
the strength or the hunting skills of the predators. The elasticity of 
the explanation did not end there. Quadrangular signs […] were 
said to depict traps into which animals would fall. Other signs were 
taken to be hunters’ hides or dwellings of spirits.32
But the elasticity of the hypothesis could not hide blatant contradictions such 
as: most of the animals that were hunted and eaten during this period are not, 
or only rarely, depicted in the caves. While others that were not hunted at all, or 
not frequently hunted, appear in the caves. Nor does it give us any hint 
whatsoever as to understanding why the pictures were made as they were made: 
their ‘style’ is what it is.33
If hunting magic cannot explain the ’why’ of the content and form of the 
pictures in caves, then, so it seemed, one has to turn to totemism. According to 
this hypothesis, the pictures in the caves should stage conflicts, alliances, co-
operations, inclusions and exclusions of different tribes, represented by different 
totemic animals  such as: ’the bear clan’; ’the horse clan’; ’the bison clan’; or ’the 
mammoth clan’. The only problem with this approach is that there seems to be 
no conclusive (whatever that could mean in this context) evidence to be found 
neither for nor against totemism. According to Laming-Emperaire, who does 
not seem to regard the totemism theory as even a possible candidate for the 
status of scientific explanation, what we find in the caves “seems to be 
irreconcilable with what we know about contemporary totemism”.34
Structured messages – art as language
The aforementioned art historian, Max Raphael, was according to the current 
consensus of the field, the first who stopped seeing the Paleolithic mural 
paintings as pictures in isolation, and started looking for a pattern or a 
composition in the make-up of the caves.35 He states his position quite clearly 
on the very first page of his Prehistoric Cave Paintings (1945):
 
It has been said that Paleolithic artists were incapable of dominating 
surfaces or reproducing spaces: that they could produce only 
individual animals, not groups, and certainly not compositions. 
The exact opposite of all this is true: we find not only groups, but 
compositions that occupy the length of an entire cave wall or the 
surface of a ceiling; we find representations of space, historical 
paintings, and even the golden section! But we find no primitive 
art.36
32. Lewis-Williams (2002: 47)
33. See, for example, Jouary 
(2001: 66).
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Raphael’s position in the field is quite unique. He did not publish any major 
book on the subject during his lifetime (apart from the one just quoted), but he 
corresponded with Breuil and Anette Laming-Emperaire (see below). In a large 
number of surveys of the field, he is said to be unduly forgotten, and hence he 
is not forgotten at all, at least not anymore. For example, Groenen,37 Lewis-
Williams38 and Curtis39 all give initiated and mostly positive presentations of 
his work and theories, he is mentioned by White40 as an important precursor to 
structuralism and Anati, in his very dense survey, lists him as an inspiration for 
“la methodologie structurale”.41 So, it seems that we have encountered another 
field effect here, the objective consensus about the importance of a specific 
author, not so much due to what he actually did or wrote (as is the case with 
Breuil, Laming-Emperaire, Leroi-Gourhan and many more), as to what his 
thoughts initiated, made possible and still makes possible. Raphael, seems to be 
a name around which it is possible, to construct and to uphold the doxa of the 
field today, as well as challenge at least some parts of this doxa.  
To my mind, Raphael’s book from 1945 is a strange mixture of acute 
observations and critiques (the one just cited is but one example). on the one 
hand, and quite arbitrary interpretations presented with force and conviction 
on the other. Laming-Emperaire goes as far as saying that his work “is 
unfortunately not possible to use”. Commenting that “the thesis about totemism 
is adopted without any real demonstration, without ethnographical examples 
and without critique of this ethnographical method. The hypothesis concerning 
the historical signification of the representations is also adopted without 
discussion.” 42 To this critique one may add a number of rather gratuitous 
connections, as for example what Raphael says in the process of establishing his 
own version of totemism: 
Ibsen said that that in every human face one can see an animal 
which discloses the deepest essence of its possessor’s soul; likewise, in 
every animal of the Paleolithic paintings (and even more so in every 
animal species) there is the face of a human or a human group 
which reveals its fundamental needs and motive forces through the 
animal.43 
Thus, despite the obvious interest in Raphael’s basic position for a structuralistic 
reading of the caves, I find Laming-Emperaire’s laconic statement “It is difficult 
to follow Raphael in his conclusions”44 quite understandable. 
Lewis-Williams adopts quite a different view. He writes that Laming-
Emperaire, in her book on Lascaux from 1959 (preceding her thesis by three 
years), seems to follow Raphael in a number of important ways. She:
questions the value of ethnographic parallels;•	
argues that the difficulty of access to many subterranean images pointed to •	
‘sacred’ intentions;
rejects any simple form of totemism;•	
proposes that the “the mentality of Paleolithic man was far more complex •	
than is generally supposed”; and
argues that images should be studied as planned compositions, not as •	
scatters of individual pictures painted “one at the time according to the 
needs of the hunt”.45
37.  Groenen  (1992: 92pp)
38. Lewis-Williams (2002: 52pp)
39. Curtis  (2006: 121)
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Lewis-Williams suggests that Laming-Emperaire might have refrained from 
mentioning the Marxist Raphael in her Lascaux book because of the Cold War. 
This seems rather far-fetched, since she, as we have just seen, discusses him and 
his theory in her thesis only three years later, when the Cold War by no means 
was over. So I cannot follow Lewis-Williams in seeing her rejection of Raphael’s 
theory in her thesis as an “inexplicable volt-face”.46 I would rather see Lewis-
William’s siding with Raphael as a strategic move in order to prepare the ground 
for his own theory. 
Marc Groenen, who obviously sees some problems in Raphael’s theory, 
admits that his conclusions may “make us smile” but that Raphael, was quite 
aware of their precariousness and that he saw them more as illustrations than 
as conclusion.47 Be this as it may, Groenen continues, the important thing is 
that Raphael’s fundamental idea about the structure of Paleolithic art as 
intentionally created ensembles, rather than individual works, remains valid.
This idea was indeed developed into full-fledged structuralism in the work 
of Laming-Emperaire and, especially, in the work of André Leroi-Gourhan. 
Together they were to occupy a central position in the field of cave art studies 
in France, from the early sixties up until the general decline of structuralism in 
the 1980s. 
Leroi-Gourhan developed his theory of the mural Paleolithic art as a theory 
about the ‘language of prehistory’.48 He claimed that this ’language’ was based 
on binary oppositions such as male-female, represented, in his case, by 
depictions of horses and ’straight’ signs versus bison and ’rounded’ signs.49 He 
tried to uncover the ’syntax’ of the caves, paying great heed to the cave as a 
structured space with different areas (entrance, passages, halls, sideways, end) 
with different functions. Leroi-Gourhan based his approach on an extensive 
statistical survey of the then available material,50 and he hoped (and sometimes 
claimed) that his theory would have a predictive value. Lewis-Williams, who 
acknowledges Laming-Emperaire and Leroi-Gourhan, as the “two researchers 
who […] made the greatest twentieth-century contribution to the study of 
Upper Paleolithic art,”51 recounts a conversation he once had with Leroi-
Gourhan: 
He felt that, in a cave he had never before entered, he could foretell 
the presence of, say, a horse to complement an image of a bison that 
he had just been shown – to the astonishment of his guide. But he 
registered an important reservation: he believed that the 
horse:bison::male:female opposition was only one characterization 
of the mythogram. For him, the mythogram was a vehicle that could 
carry a wide range of meanings.52
The importance of Leroi-Gourhan’s work and legacy within cave art studies, as 
well as in prehistory at large can hardly be overstated. Suffice it to mention that 
he revolutionised the methods of excavating by “rotating the axis of an 
archaeological dig by 90 degrees”53 and thus, in a truly structuralist manner, 
initiated a focusing on the horizontal relations between the findings, making it 
possible to reconstitute the life of prehistory,  not just unearth interesting 
objects.54
But even though the structuralist contribution likewise revolutionised cave 
art studies, in shifting focus from what (is depicted) to how (is it made; what 
46. Lewis-Williams (2002:57)
47.  Groenen, in Leroi-Gourhan 
(1992: 95)
48. Cf. The titel L’art pariétal – 
langage de la préhistorie, 
Leroi-Gourhan (1992).
49. Laming-Emperaire came 
to the opposite conclusion, 
claiming that horses 
represented the female 
position, and bison the male 
one (Clottes and Lewis-
Williams 2001: 86) – but 
this is not as paradoxical as 
it might seem, since it is the 
principle of opposed poles 
around which the language 
is structured that is central 
to the structuralistic position, 
not which (type of) picture is 
attributed to which pole.
50. Curtis (2006: 161)
51. Lewis-Williams (2002:55)
52. Lewis-Williams (2002:63)
53. Curtis (2006: 156)
54. In a discussion we had in the 
spring of 2003, professor 
François Lissarague, Centre 
Louis Gernet, EHESS, Paris, 
confirmed the importance of 
Leroi-Gourhan’s approach 
to the whole milieu of 
archaeology, ethnology and 
anthropology in France in 
the 1960s. He especially 
underlined the importance 
of his work at Pincevent 
for a whole generation of 
researchers. (Curtis writes 
about Pincevent – see 
2006:156 pp.)
66
structure does the images display), the theories of Leroi-Gourhan could not 
sufficiently account for new findings made. Newly-found caves did not display 
the syntax that Leroi-Gourhans theories predicted and not everything found 
on the cave walls could be explained by simple binary oppositions, nor was the 
basic contention of Paleolithic art structured around a sexual opposition very 
convincing. Structuralism was successively abandoned, in the cave art studies 
as elsewhere within the human sciences.55
Art as reports of shamans
After the end of structuralism’s predominance in the mid-1980s, there was, for 
a time, a tendency to abandon the search for the meaning of the paintings 
altogether. This period may perhaps be characterised as the return of positivism 
in cave art studies. Seeing that so many scholars had tried and failed, there was 
a tendency to simply put the question of meaning aside, restore the allures of 
hard science to the discipline, and go for the facts: What animals are depicted 
where? How many?56 But, of course, even a positivist attitude requires quite a 
large amount of interpretation, and in the turmoil of post-structuralist and 
postmodernist thought, this attitude did not last for long. The time was soon 
ripe for another attempt: the theory presented by Jean Clottes and Lewis-
Williams in their book Les Chamanes de la Préhistorie [The Shamans of 
Prehistory] (1996).
Clottes and Lewis-Williams clearly state that they are not the first to suggest 
a shamanist interpretation of cave art, but they claim to be presenting a new 
foundation for seeing and understanding the paintings in the caves, as reports 
of shamanistic activities.57 They found their argument on two basic premises:
First, the assumption that the human nervous system (that is the nervous 
system of  Homo sapiens sapiens) is basically the same today as it was around 
forty thousand years ago and that this, in turn, guarantees that if we can have 
hallucinations, then so could (and had) our forebears.58 In Clottes’ and Lewis-
Williams’ version of shamanism, the different stages of altered consciousness 
during the shamanistic trance play an important part. According to the authors, 
“neuropsychological research in laboratories have shown that one can 
distinguish between three major stages with possible overlaps.”59 During the 
first phase, the subjects entering the trance ’see’ geometrical forms “like points, 
zigzags, grids, collections of parallel or meandering lines or curves”.60 In the 
second stage, the subjects “try to rationalise their geometrical perceptions. They 
transform them, in their illusions, to objects loaded with religious or emotional 
significance, sometimes depending on the state of mind of the participant. 
Westerners, for example, may interpret a round and luminous form as a cup of 
water if they are thirsty, or as a bomb if they are afraid.”61 To reach the third 
stage the subject has to pass through a ’vortex’, into which it is drawn and at the 
end of which there is a bright light. In the vortex, the subject has its first real 
hallucinations, and once emerged from it, the subject enters “into the bizarre 
world of trance: [where] monsters, humans and environment are intensely 
real.”62 Clottes and Lewis-Williams contend, that since these different stages 
depend upon our nervous system, we are entitled to believe that our Paleolithic 
ancestors had the same kinds of illusions as we, and, given that shamanism was 
practiced during the Paleolithic period, we may therefore identify the different 
kinds of pictures and signs in the caves as ‘reports’ relating shamanistic trance 
experiences.  
55. Curtis (2006: 164) and 
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Consequently, the second basic assumption is that shamanism “is ubiquitous in 
the hunter-collector societies”. And this ever-presence is not “the result of a 
diffusion of ideas and beliefs in the world, but is partly the result of an 
unavoidable need within the hunter-collector societies, to rationalise a universal 
tendency of the human nervous system: to attain an altered states of mind.”63
From these premises the authors conclude that: 
Thus, we have every reason to postulate that certain persons, during 
the Upper Paleolithic period, passed through the three phases 
leading to deep hallucinatory states, and that these phases were 
ritualized and interpreted by groups of hunters-collectors in ways 
that were compatible with their modes of life.64
So, according to Clottes and Lewis-Williams, the paintings, the signs, and the 
engravings in the caves are the interpretations, effectuated by the hunters-
collectors, of the shamanistic experiences that they, or at least some of them, 
had passed through.
At first glance, this theory seems to combine several advantages: the use of 
contemporary neurobiology as a scientific anchorage; the capacity to explain 
both pictures and signs within one and the same framework; the explanation of 
different uses of different types of spaces within the cave (big rooms = collective 
rites; small spaces = individual quests); the forceful explanation of why there 
are no pictures of landscapes, of human dwellings and very few of the animals 
that were actually eaten: they were, and are, simply not part of the trance 
experience. 
The reception of this awakening of the shamanist theory was not altogether 
positive. In the introduction to a recent publication entitled Chamanes et arts 
préhistoriques – vision critique (Shamans and Prehistoric arts – critical visions 
(2006), several leading researchers try to spell out their doubts, and at the same 
time give their version of the recent history of the field. In sum, this is what they 
say: 
In the Anglophone world the debate started in 1988, when Lewis-Williams 
and Tom Dawson first presented the idea of a universal shamanistic explanation 
of rock art as well as mural cave, art in an article in Current Anthropology 29.2 
called The Signs of All Times. Entopic Phenomena in Upper Paleolithic Art. But 
nothing happened in France – not even when Clottes and Lewis-Williams 
published the book just mentioned. They were surprised by the lack of interest 
shown by their French-speaking colleagues, which they interpreted as ‘deliberate 
ignorance’.65 Commenting on this reaction, the group of researchers co-signing 
the introduction (Michel Lorblanchet, Jean-Loïc Le Quelle, Paul Bahn, Henri-
Paul Francfort, Brigitte Delluc and Gilles Delluc) wrote:
This absence of reaction in the country that has the largest number 
of ornamented caves was indeed surprising: The situation of the 
French research on Paleolithic art was then very special. After the 
withdrawal and subsequent disappearance of André Leroi-Gourhan, 
who had dominated our discipline for several decades, as had Abbé 
Breuil before him and for an even longer period, a new era had 
begun. It allowed everyone to express their views more freely at 
seminars (organized at Musée de L’Homme by Denis Vialou) or 
63. Ibid. (94)
64. Ibid. (94)
65. Ibid. (155) 
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within the working of the Groupe de Réflexion sur les Méthodes 
d’Etude de l’Art Pariétal Paléolithique [The group for reflection on 
the methods of study of the Paleolithic mural art] (initiated by 
Michel Lorblanchet in Caberets).66 
But this state of bliss did not last very long:
The discovery of the French caves Cosquer and Chauvet, recently 
completed by that of the Cussac cave – a site of extraordinary 
importance in our discipline  – had, paradoxically, a negative effect: 
They put an end to the ephemeral opening of the research through 
stirring up antagonisms that made the French researchers withdraw 
to their ongoing research, especially as one of the defenders of the 
shamanistic hypothesis occupied important administrative 
functions and determining editorial responsibilities within the 
domain of French prehistory.67
Commenting on the publication of Clottes’s and Lewis-Williams’s Les Chamanes 
de la Préhistorie (1996) they even say that “far from being a revelation, [this 
book] suggested a return to ethnographic comparatism, a procedure that had 
been largely criticised by contemporary authors, and to a totalising interpretation 
that had already, during the 20th century, been presented in vain by several pre-
historians.”68 
All in all, the group co-signing the preface rendered the theory presented by 
Clottes and Lewis-Williams a scientific disaster, one further supported by a 
general and widespread popularity of shamanism. They saw them “flattering 
the public taste for the mysterious and the marvellous” and they conclude that 
the theory “is bereft of scientific foundation”.69
This is of course only one side of the story. One finds quite a different 
description of the recent history of the field in Curtis (2006).70 He concludes his 
very sympathetic presentation of Clottes, and his somewhat more restrained 
discussion of the shamanist theory, with these words:
But, unfortunately perhaps, the shamanistic theory has not inspired 
either many converts or new and productive skills. Still, Shamans is 
a brave book and an important one. Despite occasional excesses, it 
confronted the meaning of the cave paintings head-on and argued 
for an interpretation that was consistent within itself and with the 
facts presented by the caves. Yes, that interpretation was suggested 
by ethnographic analogy, but that in itself does not mean it is wrong. 
Shamans arrived, it was vilified, and now it is generally ignored by 
academics. Perhaps its day will come.71 
With this, I have reached the end of my brief exposé and discussion of some of 
the different attempts at grasping and explaining the images in the Paleolithic 
caves. I have, without any ambition to tell the whole story, tried to reflect upon 
some features related to the shaping, and the structure, of the field of cave art 
studies such as: the formation of the doxa; of the field; and of its inherent 
conflicts. And, as I have already said, these features may inform us about some 
of the possibilities and dangers that every new academic field may encounter in 
66. Lorblanchet et al. (2006: 5)
67.  Ibid. (6)
68. Ibid. (6)
69. Ibid. (6, 7)
70. Curtis (2006: 217ff.)
71. Ibid. (227)
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its formative period. Today the situation in cave art studies seems to be more or 
less like the one Curtis describes – after the shamanist theory, no new major 
attempts have been made at deciphering the cave art, nor has the old ones been 
completely surpassed. This is especially true of the structuralist approach, 
which still seems to generate fruitful research, even though the details of the 
theories presented by Leroi-Gourhan and others seem to have been disproved.
What it could mean to validate an interpretation
The short history I have just presented revolves around one central question: 
How are we to assess the validity of these interpretations? And what does a 
doxological stance imply as to the answering of this question? In discussing 
these questions I will once again, and in a similar strategic move, address some 
issues that I believe to be of central importance for the formation of a new 
epistemic domain such as artistic research, while trying to avoid the pitfalls of 
a simple reproduction of the conceptual structures already at hand in the 
human and social sciences. In saying this, I want to stress that this domain in 
the making is not compelled to frame its epistemological concerns in any 
traditional way whatsoever, but that it has no choice but to relate to the always 
already present academic tradition when shaping its own criteria, practices and 
assumptions. 
In the chapter on interpretations of cave art in his book The Mind in the 
Cave (2002), Lewis-Williams summons up some criteria “by which scientists 
judge and compare hypothesis” and that, according to him, have to be met for 
a scientific theory to be acceptable.72 As a point of departure for a more 
doxological assessment, I will use these criteria, which I take to represent fairly 
well the common doxa within cave art studies, and no doubt also the common 
doxa within most of the contemporary human and social sciences in general. 
And, as I think that this debate has further scope more than just the demarcation 
of doxology in a narrow sense, I trust these reflections to prove to be useful in 
the domain of artistic research.
Let me start with a brief paraphrase of Lewis-William’s criteria, before I 
discuss them one by one, and in some detail:
Lewis-Williams’ first point is that an explanation of a phenomenon must 1. 
accord with received, well-supported general work as well as with overall 
theory. 
Secondly, he continues, a hypothesis must be internally consistent, that is, 2. 
does not contradict itself. 
His third criterion is that a hypothesis that covers a diverse field of evidence 3. 
is more persuasive than one that pertains to only one, narrow type of 
evidence.
Fourthly, he continues, a hypothesis must be such that verifiable, empirical 4. 
facts can be deduced from it: that a hypothesis must relate explicitly to 
observable features of data.
Fifthly, he concludes, a useful hypothesis have a heuristic potential, that is, 5. 
they lead on to further questions and research. 73
Up to a certain point I find these criteria to be both sensible and reasonable, to 
adopt them when trying to evaluate a suggested theory, hypothesis or 
interpretation (of cave art or of any other kind of phenomena within the 
72. Lewis-Williams  (2002: 48)
73. Ibid. (48-49) I have rendered 
Lewis-Williams’s wordings 
quite closely, but my  paraph-
rase is not to be taken as a 
regular quote.
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human sciences). But, from a doxological point of view, it is not all that clear 
how we are to understand them. For example, how are we to comprehend the 
implicit separation of interpretation from fact, of explanation from 
interpretation, or, for that matter, of evidence from illusion present in Lewis-
Williams’ thoughts?  All these distinctions seem to be unproblematic for Lewis-
Williams, at least on the programmatic level, whereas they all need to be 
qualified before they can be accepted as doxological tools. 
The first part of the primary criterion seems to fit rather well with the 
notion that in science one has to depart from, and in that sense comply with, 
the pre-existing knowledge within the discipline or the field. In the words of 
Ludwick Fleck: “The existing fund of knowledge must be a third party in this 
relation [ie. cognition] as a basic factor of all new knowledge.”74 Hence the first 
part of this criterion is quite uncontroversial from a doxlogical point of view. 
But the second part (that the explanation must accord “with overall theory”) is 
more problematic. Judging from the example presented by Lewis-Williams 
(“one cannot explain an aberration in a planet’s orbit by invoking laser beams 
directed at it from living beings in the vicinity of Alpha Centauri”)75 this part 
of the criterion is heavily dependent on a specific version of what one may 
perhaps call the scientific common-sense of the beginning of the Twenty-first 
Century within the Anglo-Saxon world. That one ’cannot’ invoke lasers used by 
beings living on Alfa Centauri is simply not true. Of course one can invoke such 
an explanation. We all (I presume) tend to agree with Lewis-Williams that it is 
a bad explanation, or even that it is evidently wrong. But from a doxological 
point of view, this is not, in itself, enough for us to dismiss it. We only need to 
recall Michel Foucault’s statement about Mendel,76 who evidently told the truth 
but who was not received within ’the true’ of the biological discourse of his 
time, to realise how shaky and misleading such evidences may be. No, from a 
doxological standpoint, the evocation of Alfa Centauri activity cannot be 
dismissed simply by a reference to overall theory. One has to show why, in this 
specific case, this specific explanation is insufficient or unacceptable in relation 
to the knowledge claim made. Thus, the doxological stance does not necessarily 
imply a change in what is conceived as an acceptable explanation of a fact, or an 
acceptable solution to a problem, but it does imply a change in attitude towards 
what seems to be evidently wrong, or strange or just simply weird. The 
foundation of doxic knowledge can never be (the experience of) evidence, nor 
(a reference to) what is given. It has to be construed, each time, within the 
specific epistemic field, using the specific methods of the field, always keeping 
in mind that the construction might have been different, and may become so in 
a near or far future. 
I find the second criteria – that a hypothesis must be internally consistent 
– to be completely acceptable also within a doxological notion of science (I do 
not really see what it could mean not to accept this criterion), with the important 
precaution that one cannot treat the notion of consistency as something given. 
What is, and what is not consistent depends upon, among other things, how 
narrow or how widely one needs to define one’s terms (or, as the case may be, 
actions, practices, and notions). For a certain type of philosophy it is quite 
unacceptable to claim that Socrates is both immortal and man; for another it is 
quite acceptable, it all depends upon how one chooses to define immortality. 
The reasons for choosing are always dependent upon the doxa of the field, upon 
your position in the field, as well as upon your reasons for defining the notion, 
74.  Fleck (1981:38)
75. Lewis-Williams (2002: 49)
76. In  L’Ordre du discours, 
Foucault’s inaugural lecture at 
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action, or habit in question. (Choice is dependent upon what you want to do 
with the definition or the notion in question.) So no matter if consistency is a 
well and unequivocally defined concept within certain domains of the scientific 
field, it always needs to be put into relation with the ever-changing doxic 
conditions in the specific epistemic field, that conditions the knowledge of this 
field. 
The third criterion is an interestingly rhetorical one: that a “hypothesis that 
covers diverse field of evidence is more persuasive than one that pertains only 
to one, narrow type of evidence”. It differs from the other two in making a claim 
about what is “more persuasive”, that is, it makes a general, I would even say 
universalistic, claim about the presumed effects of a certain kind of hypothesis 
on every kind of audience. Again, I am not quarrelling with Lewis-Williams 
concerning the content of the criterion, I think he is right, and I think that it 
may be shown both historically, and within contemporary science, that such 
hypothesises have in fact been, and are, more generally accepted than 
hypothesises with narrow scopes. But what does this mean? The example given 
by Lewis-Williams is telling: “For example, if the theory of gravity applied only 
to inanimate objects, such as tennis balls, and not to living creatures, such as 
people, its explanatory value would be so limited that scientists would reject 
it.”77 The example states something that is no doubt true about a specific kind 
of audience (scientists), in relation to a specific explanation of why “what goes 
up must come down”. The force of the example – it persuading effect upon us, 
readers of Lewis-Williams – depends upon ou preconceived notions about 
what kind of interests scientists have: We tend (or are supposed) to think that a 
scientist is someone who is interested in formulating general laws for everything, 
and that this is the reason why they would not content themselves with an 
explanation that only concerned ’\inanimate objects’. So the criterion, that 
seemed to be universally valid, is in fact only valid in relation to a certain notion 
of science and scientist, which, again, makes a case for promoting the doxological 
notions of situatedness, dependence upon historical and disciplinary conditions 
as well as upon specific interests of the actors involved.78 To be plain: A narrow 
hypothesis may be just as persuasive as a broad one, it all depends on: the 
situation; the field; the doxa; the actors; the history of the field; the (personal) 
history of the actors; the pre-existing knowledge; on who (the orator) has 
announced the hypothesis; on who receives it (the audience); on the actual 
power-structure of the relationships between all these factors; and so forth. 
The fourth criterion is a classical empirical one: One must be able to deduce 
“verifiable, empirical facts” from a hypothesis, it must “relate explicitly to 
observable features of data”. Perhaps this seems quite straightforward.  The 
hypothesis is supposed to say something about the world that can be checked 
by looking at the world and seeing how it is. But there is no way the world is in 
and of itself, what we see is formed by our selves, our concepts, our 
presuppositions and our interests, and we have no way of knowing whether or 
when our hypothesis correspond to ’the world as it is’. Therefore, from a 
doxological standpoint this criterion, which of course may be a valid one, must 
be understood as stating something about the requirements in force within the 
scientific field, discipline or doxa in question, but not something about science 
or research in general. (For instance, I completely agree with Lewis-Williams 
when he says the ’art for art’s sake’ hypothesis fails to comply with this 
requirement, and therefore should be rejected.) It may very well be the case that 
77. Lewis-Williams (2002: 48)
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most so-called empirical sciences cherish some version of this criterion, 
nevertheless its application has to be determined and discussed specifically in 
each case. The doxological position does not endorses a laissez-faire relativism: 
we need to distinguish facts from guesses, truths from illusions, knowing from 
believing, but we have to make these distinctions in the full awareness that they 
are our own constructions. Fabrications made by ourselves in order to deal 
with the human world that is ours, and that their validity is, and has always 
been, confined within our human cusiom-made version of the world. So what 
a fact or a datum is, as well as the significance of ’verifiable’ and ’observable’, 
must, again, be decided within the specific scientific domain. Each field 
construes its own epistemology, in constant confrontation and cooperation 
with that which surrounds it. An urgent and delicate issue for artistic research.
Lewis-Williams’ fifth criterion is of a slightly different kind. It tells us that 
useful hypothesis should have a ’heuristic potential’, that is that they should be 
able to “lead on to further questions and research”. In a way, this is a very 
doxological criterion, since what is useful and what is to be counted as further 
questions, has to be identified in relation to the already existing bodies of 
knowledge, and in recognition of specific interests and desires within and in 
between scientists, disciplines, epistemic fields, and cultures. What is, and what 
is not a fruitful hypothesis has to be determined anew, in each specific case, 
with hindsight as well as foresight. And with an as clear as possible a notion of 
the constraints and possibilities contained within the doxa. The yardstick for 
judging whether a certain hypothesis has a heuristic potential or not, is always 
to test it within a discipline or an epistemic field and see what kind of results it 
may yield. Its eventual usefulness may, in happy cases, be judged completely 
from within the discipline or the field, but more often than not will be the 
result of negotiation between scientific, personal, economic, political, and 
institutional interests. We have seen some traces of such negotiations in the 
history of cave art in the controversy around the Shamanistic hypothesis, but 
there are of course far worse, and more threatening examples in abundance.
To conclude – and open again
Transformed according to the above qualifications, I think that the five criteria 
for evaluating different hypothesis may serve well within a doxological approach 
to knowing and knowledge. But if they are to be useful, they have to be 
complemented by profound understanding of the field’s doxa, or the discipline 
in question. And here the domain of artistic research presents unique 
possibilities, since its doxa is still in formation. But how, according to what 
criteria, and answering what needs, should it be shaped? For reasons stated in 
the opening of this essay, I will not try to answer these questions in a direct 
way. 
However, I would like to be explicit on one specific point: The traditional 
concept of knowledge (knowledge defined as true, justified belief, or certainty), 
still dominant within Anglo-Saxon epistemology, should be avoided in the 
domain of artistic research. It implies a notion of knowledge and knowing that 
is almost exclusively discursive, and would thus import a completely inadequate 
epistemic structure to the field. A doxological conception of knowing and 
knowledge, incorporating skills and practices as well as possible forms of 
representation in knowledge, seems to be more promising for this new field. But 
exactly how such a concept should be formed, expanded, applied, and used in 
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order to mark out the kind of knowledge produced within the field is a question 
of strategy, reformulation and careful implementation. Here, the work remains 
to be done.
I opened this text by invoking the rhetorical tradition, and the benefits of 
arguing through an example, in this case the formation, history, and content of 
cave art studies. Using the same strategy I would like to make some concluding 
remarks, relating to issues that have to be taken into account when trying to 
establish a yet unseen epistemic domain.
We have seen that the dominance of a few, or at times, a single perspective 
(Breuil or Leroi-Gourhan) in the field cave art studies has not always promoted 
a better understanding of the paintings in caves. Different trends of interpretation 
have succeeded one another, producing more and more knowledge of the caves, 
the techniques, the paintings, but no definite answers as to the signification of 
cave art as such. Looking at cave art studies from the outside (and especially in 
the context of strategic writing about artistic research that I am engaged in 
here), I do not think this is necessarily a bad thing. The different approaches 
appear, linger, disappear for a while, and then pop up again to form new 
constellations. Perhaps the advances in this domain is at least partly due to this 
kind of immanent connections, where present questions merge with historical 
concerns to form new positions of force within the field.
We have also seen the importance of field effects for the shaping of cave art 
studies. Works presenting the history of the field do not only report what has 
happened, they inevitably (sometimes unconsciously or unwillingly) shape the 
past according to specific preferences, positions and points of views. Scholars 
have to pay allegiance to their academic forbears in order to inscribe themselves 
in the field and acquire a position from which to speak and be heard, before 
they can distinguish themselves and present their own views. Fierce struggles 
about the correct methods of interpretation, structure the field.
In the discipline of cave art, the notion of ’art’ has become a contested 
concept. The uncanny modernity of the paintings seem to evoke an aesthetic 
approach, whereas the archaeological necessities, central to cave art studies, 
almost exclusively allows for a natural science attitude towards the findings in 
the caves. This cohabitation has, as we have seen, not been altogether easy, 
demanding special skills of bricolage and multi-competency from the scholars 
in the field. They always run the risk of being accused of being either too arty, 
or too scientific. A danger that seems to surface in artistic research as soon as 
one makes the mistake of adding art to science, without allowing for a double 
transformation of the concepts. I hope that my discussion of the debate between 
Lorblanchet and Conkey has given some food for thought regarding this 
dilemma.
Accepting Bourdieu’s tenet that different academic fields function in 
essentially similar ways, we may, I think, learn a lot from the development of 
cave art research. For instance, we may sensibly ask where we find, and how do 
we recognise the positions of the Max Raphael, the Annette Laming-Emperaire, 
the Abbé Breuil, the Jean Clottes and the André Leroi-Gourhan of artistic 
research? Are there such people at all, or will there be? (And what is, to remain 
within Bourdieu’s vocabulary, the field-specific capital that make artistic 
researchers tick?) 
In order to answer these questions, one has to identify and describe the 
doxa of the field. A task that is still more normative than descriptive when it 
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comes to artistic research. So, even if the factors influencing this young discipline 
are many and divergent, acting upon it from different sides, there is still a large 
amount of flexibility within the field. In a way it is up for grabs for each and 
every actor with an interest in artistic research.  
Not wanting to participate in a premature closing and structuring of the 
field, I will not conclude this essay on a dogmatic note, trying to spell out my 
idea of what artistic research should and should not be. I would rather leave 
these doxological reflections as a possibility for whomever would like to make 
use of them, hoping that my reasoning, my choice of cave art as an example and 
my critiques and suggestions thus will prove their worth and become part of a 
new way of dealing with the art of knowledge.
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